Three children and a teacher were killed at Silver Rail Elementary School in Bend, Oregon, on October 15. Other victims were seriously injured. Families now face an unimaginable absence, and an entire community must carry the grief, fear and lasting consequences of that afternoon.
My deepest sympathy goes to the families who lost loved ones, the survivors, the students and educators, and everyone whose sense of safety was shattered.
Alongside that sorrow, I feel frustration and anger.
As public officials, security practitioners and law enforcement professionals, we must confront an uncomfortable question: Are we building security programs that meaningfully increase survivability, or accepting measures that make us feel protected while leaving foreseeable vulnerabilities exposed?
According to Bend Police, the attacker climbed a fence and fired through the glass panes of locked exterior doors before entering a classroom. Those doors were locked. He gained entry anyway.
That fact deserves our attention.
We owe this community a thorough investigation, and we should recognize the extraordinary courage of those who intervened. We also owe every other community the willingness to examine its own vulnerabilities now.
A camera can record an attack. An access control system can secure a lock. Gunshot detection can trigger an alert. Entry screening can identify weapons at a controlled checkpoint. Each has a role—but their value depends on how they work together and what happens when someone attempts to bypass them.
A locked entrance with vulnerable glass demands more than confidence in the lock.
Security becomes theater when the presence of equipment substitutes for an honest assessment of performance. How much time does the system actually provide? What happens after the glass breaks? Can occupants reach safety before an attacker reaches them?
CISA’s school security guidance calls for coordinated layers that detect, delay and support response, including stronger doors and glazing. Physical resistance belongs in that conversation.
Too often, “It won’t happen here” quietly becomes a planning assumption. A safe reputation, a desirable ZIP code or a history without violence provides no exemption from foreseeable risk.
People experiencing distress need support. Grievances and threatening behavior need attention. Online communications must be considered when assessing concerning conduct: the Secret Service specifically identifies social media and other communications as potential sources of information about grievances and violent intentions. Assessment must focus on behavior and evidence.
Schools, places of worship and employers have two responsibilities that should advance together: improve their ability to recognize and address developing threats and strengthen the infrastructure protecting people when warning fails.
A fence can provide a layer of protection. We must also plan for the determined individual who gets past it.
That means examining glass entryways and accessible exterior windows. Understand the existing glass thickness, framing, anchoring and door hardware. Ask what can be strengthened, what requires replacement, and what independently tested performance the complete assembly can deliver.
Forced-entry resistance and bullet resistance address different needs. Select protection for the actual threat and verify the installation requirements.
Harden the glass where the assessment calls for it. Build physical resistance into the response plan. Give people more time.
No measure guarantees survival. That uncertainty makes thoughtful preparation more urgent.
Once a vulnerability is identified, leaving it unresolved should require an accountable decision and a plan. Deferring action indefinitely transfers the consequences to the people inside.
Our responsibility is to create environments where people can live, work, learn and worship without fear. That requires us to challenge familiar practices, demand evidence and act on what we learn.
Let’s stop treating the next tragedy as something that will happen somewhere else.
Protect human capital. Harden the glass. Turn seconds into minutes—when it matters most.
Are we building security programs that meaningfully increase survivability, or accepting measures that make us feel protected while leaving foreseeable vulnerabilities exposed?